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Abstract
There is a lack of built-in privacy mechanisms within the
current identity management systems. The guarantee a user
has about their privacy is merely the ‘trust’ that the ser-
vice providers will enforce their privacy requirements. The
contribution of this paper is a proposal for the extension of
existing Federated Single Sign-On (FSSO) systems to adopt
the beneficial properties of the User-Centric Identity Man-
agement (UCIM) model to provide an identity management
system that allows the users to control and enforce their pri-
vacy requirements while still retaining the convenient fea-
tures of FSSO. By having an identity management system
that respects user’s privacy in a concrete manner as op-
posed to a simple ‘trust’, users will trust the current elec-
tronic communication medium more and hence allows more
services to grow in this field.
1. Introduction and related works
A Federated Single Sign-on (FSSO) system is an iden-
tity management system (IMS) that allows the use of the
same user’s Personal Identification Information (PII) across
multiple organizations within a federation. In essence, this
allows users to access services from different organizations
but they are only required to enter their authentication data
once. An FSSO system is made up of a group of Identity
Providers (IdP) and Service Providers (SP). An IdP pro-
vides services related to the management and usage of the
user’s PII, and an SP provides services that users consume.
IdP and SP are roles, therefore, an entity can be an IdP and
an SP at the same time. Several existing FSSO systems are:
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) version 1.1
and 2.0 [13, ], Liberty ID-FF (Identity Federation Frame-
work) [15], and WS-Federation [1].
One of the main problems with the FSSO model is user
privacy. FSSO systems concentrate users’ PII into IdPs. A
user can divide their PII between several IdPs, however each
IdP still has a chunk of the user’s PII and can still track some
of the user’s activities. Similarly, SPs can also gather infor-
mation about a user from the information they get from the
IdPs. Sharing of user’s information by malicious IdPs and
SPs can reveal a complete user’s identity and activities. In
an FSSO system, users have no control over the disclosure
of their PII. IdPs and SPs are assumed to be trusted entities,
but this is not always the case [16].
An IMS that allows concrete enforcement of user’s pri-
vacy requirement, instead of a mere ‘trust’, is needed. The
User Centric Federated Single Sign On System (UFed) pro-
posed in this paper provides user privacy without sacrificing
convenience and ease-of-use. The main contribution of this
system is an architecture that adopts the User Centric Iden-
tity Management (UCIM) concepts into the existing FSSO
systems.
UCIM systems are designed from the user’s perspective
[12]. These systems allow the users to have an effective
control of the use and management of their PII. The most
common UCIM mechanism is the use of a device that can
be configured as desired by users to assist them in man-
aging their PII. The device can be used to complete tasks
such as enforcement of the privacy requirements, storage
and modification of PII. The design of UFed enhances and
does not replace existing FSSO systems. This provides an
easier migration path for organizations that have already im-
plemented an FSSO system.
Related to UFed is PRIME [8], which is a European
government-funded project whose goal mirrors UFed: to
develop a privacy enhancing identity management sys-
tem. PRIME is a UCIM system that aims to give users
‘sovereignty over their personal data’ [8]. The main feature
of PRIME is the ability to protect user’s privacy through
several mechanisms: provision for user’s consent and con-
trol, privacy policy negotiation, and data minimization.
These are enforced through several methods: cryptographic
applications, trusted platform, and others. The main differ-
ence between PRIME and UFed is that UFed is built based
on existing FSSO systems while PRIME is not. Bhargav-
Spantzel et al [5] laid out some properties of a user-centric
federated identity management system, upon which UFed
is based on.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: Sec-
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tion 2 will describe a generic threat model for today’s iden-
tity management system. Section 3 will describe the se-
curity requirements for UFed. Section 4 will provide an
overview of the UFed architecture. Section 5 will provide
two use case scenarios: setup and single sign-on (SSO).
Section 6 will provide further discussion on several impor-
tant aspects of UFed, and a conclusion in Section 7.
2. Threat model
A threat model for identity management system is pro-
posed as follows:
1. External attackers can monitor and capture all com-
munications between all of the interacting entities, and
have knowledge of all cryptographic algorithms, pro-
tocols and other mechanisms employed to secure com-
munications, except the cryptographic key(s) used.
2. The providers (both IdPs and SPs) are not uncondition-
ally trusted entities. A substantial number of success-
ful security attacks originated from within the affected
organization itself [16]. It is assumed that there is a
possibility that a provider could compromise a user’s
information.
3. Users are not to be fully trusted. There is a potential
that users will provide false information to gain some
personal advantages.
We argue that IdPs and SPs are not unconditionally
trusted entities because of alarming frequencies of data
breaches incidents that have been happening, such as in [16]
which showed that Threat 2 is a real threat.
3. UFed security requirements
The security requirements for UFed, based on the threat
model, will be laid out. Apart from PRIME, none of the
existing SSO systems, to the extent of our current knowl-
edge, have these built-in privacy-respecting requirements in
their designs. The requirements are layered (Figure 1): the
first layer is for the basic requirements for UFed, the sec-
ond layer states the essential requirements to enable user-
controlled privacy, the third layer states the specific UFed
operations requirements.
Registration Data Storage Accountability OthersAuthentication
Minimal Data Sharing and Diclosure Negotiation
User Control and Network Communication Security
Figure 1. Layers of Requirements
Requirement 1.1 - user control: User should be in
control of their PII in all operations that involve the use
of their PII. User consent must be obtained either by pre-
configuration (which can be changed as the user wishes to)
or per request basis. This requirement is to counter Threat
2 by providing the users with control over the information
disclosed to IdPs and SPs, thus, reducing the chance of mis-
use.
Requirement 1.2 - communication security: The com-
munications between all interacting entities in UFed should
be secured against Threat 1.
Requirement 2.1 - minimal data sharing and disclo-
sure: In UFed, user’s PII can still be shared but explicit
user consent has to be obtained, respecting the concept of
minimum data sharing and disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion. This means that whenever possible, the user’s sensitive
information should not be shared to those that do not need
them, but when they are needed, the least revealing level of
data disclosure should be opted. Levels of data disclosure
are: Level 1 - for a non-disclosure of PII value, but a disclo-
sure of its characteristics (for example, instead of revealing
the user’s date of birth, only a statement that the user is over
18 years old is revealed), and Level 2 - for a disclosure of
the PII value. This requirement is to counter Threat 2 by
minimizing PII known to providers.
Requirement 2.2 - negotiation: To achieve requirement
2.1, a negotiation procedure is used. User should be allowed
to negotiate on the PII that the user wants to reveal and at
what level they are willing to disclose it. The amount of
PII collected should be proportionate to necessity and risks
of the transaction [10]. Sometimes it is at the user’s best
interest to reveal more of their PII to let other party iden-
tify them correctly, especially when misidentification could
have serious consequences, such as in health care. However,
Threat 2 states that there is a possibility that the revealed PII
will be compromised. Thus, a user also needs to assess the
consequences of compromised PII and the probability of it
happening. Negotiation is therefore an important process to
agree on which PII to reveal and the disclosure level based
on the nature of the transaction, and the calculated risks.
Requirement 3.1 - user registration: User should be
able to negotiate the PII to be registered and their disclo-
sure level as per requirement 2.1 and 2.2. To counter Threat
3, a mechanism should be put to allow certification of criti-
cal information to ensure the correctness of the information.
However, to avoid the problem of having the users in a dis-
advantaged position whereby they have to provide certified
PII all the time, there should be a provision to allow users
to provide uncertified PII (further discussion on this issue in
section 6).
Requirement 3.2 - anonymous authentication: For
privacy, a user should be able to be authenticated in such
a way that allows the authenticator to verify that the user is
a valid entity that is recognized by an authority in the feder-
ation without revealing the user’s true identifier.
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Requirement 3.3 - data storage: To counter Threat 2,
the storage of the user’s PII should be secured from the pos-
sibility of the providers compromising the user’s records.
User’s information can only be used under the collabora-
tion with the owner of the information.
Requirement 3.4 - accountability: For transactions
where accountability is important, a provider should main-
tain the log of the transaction activities. For privacy, the
user’s activities log files should be maintained as per re-
quirement 3.3. In the case of a security breach investiga-
tion whereby the user refuses to cooperate, only the rele-
vant legal authority has the ability to forcefully reveal the
log data. If the user was anonymously authenticated as per
requirement 3.2, there should be a mechanism to revoke the
anonymity.
4. UFed architecture
The architecture of UFed (Figure 2) will be explained to
show the interaction between the entities in UFed and how
the security requirements can be fulfilled.
Negotiator
Negotiator
Negotiator
USER
(1) AC CC
Uncertified PII
Certificates Store
(3)
(4)   UFIMS ADAPTERUSER AGENT
   UFIMS ADAPTER
(IdP)
(7)
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(5)
(2)
ATTRIBUTE ISSUER (AI)
(6)
LEGAL AUTHORITY (8)
Resources
Resources
Figure 2. The UFed Architecture
There are several additional entities in UFed. Attribute
Issuer (AI) is a provider that has the authority to issue at-
tributes about a user, such as the user’s credit card informa-
tion, bank account, and so on. This information is conveyed
in the form of certificates that are trusted in the federation.
The nature of AIs operations allows them to collect user’s
PII and it is of user’s best interest to be identified correctly
by the AIs, such as banks and birth registry department.
UFed Adapter is a software component that handles the
UFed protocols without causing major changes to the exist-
ing FSSO protocols. This is a critical component for this is
where most adaptation is done to bridge the existing FSSO
protocols into UFed. The main role of this adapter is to in-
tercept the normal FSSO protocol flows where appropriate,
and to execute the necessary UFed protocols, before contin-
uing the normal FSSO protocol flows as required.
Legal Authority is an entity that is responsible for the
law enforcement. In UFed context, this authority can reveal
the user’s identity.
4.1. Interaction between UFed entities
Interaction (1) shows the use of User Agent (UA) (such
as a PDA or a browser plug-in) to help users with their iden-
tity management activities. UA has a reasonable computa-
tional power to do protocols execution, cryptographic op-
erations, and data storage. User obtains two types of cer-
tificate from AI (2), and store them in the certificate store
(3). Attribute Certificate (AC) contains the exact user’s PII
value. Disclosure of data in this certificate is a Level 2 dis-
closure. The Character Certificate (CC), also issued by the
AI, contains not the exact value of the user’s attributes, but
only the characteristics of the user’s attributes. Revelation
of attributes in this certificate is a Level 1 disclosure.
UA interacts with IdP (4) and SP (5) directly as needed.
IdP and SP also interact with each other (7) according to the
traditional FSSO protocol flows. However, the role of IdP
in UFed is different from traditional FSSO. In UFed, IdP
still provides SSO and other FSSO services, but it does not
store the user’s PII permanently. In UFed, IdP only handles
per-session registration to maintain the user’s anonymity.
When a user is registered to IdP permanently, there will
be a need for an identifier that will be used to identify the
user. This conflicts with requirement 3.2 and enables IdP to
track the user’s activities. With per session registration, the
user can be assigned a one-time pseudonym to be used for
that session only. At the end of the session, the pseudonym
will be useless. Even if the IdP is malicious and retains
the pseudonym and the linked PII, it still cannot profile the
user’s activities because the next time the user authenticates
to IdP, a new pseudonym will be used, and there will be
no way the IdP can link the PII revealed from previous
sessions with the new pseudonym, unless the revealed PII
themselves leak linkable information - which is why the use
of CC instead of AC is crucial.
For negotiation, a software component called Negotiator
is used. As per requirement 2.2, Negotiator should also in-
clude the relevant risk calculation capability. UA, IdP and
SP should have their own negotiator component that they
can set according to their preferences.
If Level 1 disclosure is used, additional steps might have
to be executed (6). For example, when an SP requires a
user’s credit card information to complete a purchase and
the user is only willing to provide Level 1 disclosure (the
use of CC), the user has to first obtain the CC from the
user’s bank to certify that the user has a valid credit card
to complete the purchase. This is normally done for the PII
that are not static, such as, in this case, the available credit
on the user’s credit card account. On the other hand, some
CC that certify static PII can be pre-obtained, such as a CC
to certify that the user is at least 18 years of age.
Accountability process (8) involves interactions between
the user, IdP, SP and Legal Authority. While a user might
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want to be anonymous, sometimes the anonymity has to be
revoked, such as in a security breach investigation. A set of
conditions need to be agreed to determine the circumstances
under which the user’s anonymity can be revoked.
4.2. Security requirements fulfillment
To fulfill requirement 1.2 for communication security,
Web Services (WS) [2, 14] messages with encryption and
digital signatures can be used. However, onion routing is
also needed in order to prevent traffic analysis.
To satisfy the user-controlled requirement 1.1 in UFed,
a usable UA and protocols that allow enforcement of user
privacy requirements in various aspects of UFed operations
are needed. The former requires good user interface design
for the UA, while the latter requires a set of protocols to be
designed for the specific UFed operations.
The application of private credential mechanism [4]
can be used as the basic mechanism to fulfill some of the
UFed requirements: data minimization (requirement 2.1),
user registration (requirement 3.1), anonymous authenti-
cation (requirement 3.2), and accountability (requirement
3.4). The application of the credential mechanism to ful-
fill these UFed’s security requirements will be explained
on an abstract level. The concrete implementation of the
mechanism is provided in the original paper itself [4]. The
credential mechanism uses the SRSA-CL signature [6], Ca-
menisch and Shoup verifiable encryption [9] and BM-CL
signature scheme [7].
The private credential mechanism uses zero knowledge
proof interactive protocol that is executed by both the
Prover and Verifier. To simplify, the Proof of Knowledge
(PK) protocol is represented by this notation (as used in
[4]): PK{(ma): F(ma,mb...mi) = 1}. The data on the left
hand side of the colon ma is the data item that the Prover
needs to prove the knowledge of and which the Verifier will
not learn in the process, and the function F(ma,mb...mi) is
the function to be executed to enable the proof of the knowl-
edge of data item ma. The data items mb...mi are known
to the Verifier. The actual protocol involves one or more
message exchange(s).
Cert1 is a certificate issued by an AI1: Cert1 =
Sign(ma, mb, .....mj ;KSignAI1). The KSignAI1 is pri-
vate to the issuer AI1, while the signature verification key
KV erifyAI1 is assumed to be publicly known and authenti-
cated. The PII ma.....mj are issued by AI1, with ma as the
user pseudonym issued by AI1. The credential mechanism
allows the execution of various protocols to achieve several
useful capabilities.
Protocol 1 - partial release of PII: The first capability
of this credential mechanism is the ability to release the PII
in a certificate partially as needed. This capability is useful
in fulfilling requirement 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2. With this capa-
bility, a user can reveal only the necessary PII during user
registration (3.1). User can also be authenticated without
revealing the pseudonym (3.2). Both of these requirements
depend on an effective data minimization capability (2.1).
For example, a user has Cert1 and only wants to release
PII mg...mj . The protocol represented by the following no-
tation can be executed:
PK{ (Cert1, ma...mf ):
VerifySign( Cert1, ma...mf ,mg...mj ;KV erifyAI1 ) = 1}
Successful execution of the above protocol allows user to
prove the possession of a valid certificate issued by AI1,
and reveals only the PII that needed to be released, hence,
fulfillment of data minimization requirement 2.1. This is
useful for enabling the user to reveal only a limited amount
of their PII during registration, hence, fulfillment of require-
ment 3.1. If the user’s pseudonym ma is also not revealed,
then the user was authenticated anonymously: the verifier
only knows that the user is a valid entity known by AI1
without learning the pseudonym. This provides fulfillment
of requirement 3.2. An implication of this is that if the user
shows this certificate multiple times, they are not linkable
since ma is not known. As per Threat 2, even if the IdP and
SP collide to share user’s information, they will not be able
to do it since there are no known pseudonyms to make the
linking possible.
Protocol 2 - blind certification: This credential mech-
anism can also do blind certification. Assume that a user
wants to obtain an additional certificate from another AI
called AI2 based on the user’s year of birth (PII mj) from
the primary certificate Cert1. However, the user does not
want to reveal the pseudonym and any other data items
ma...mi, while still needing the new certificate to contain
the pseudonym ma. Before AI2 can issue the secondary
certificate, it needs assurance that the hidden pseudonym
ma was issued by AI1. This can be achieved by ‘blind cer-
tification’ protocol represented by the following notation:
PK{ (Cert1, r, ma...mi) : Ca = Commit(ma,r) ∧
VerifySign( Cert1, ma...mi, mj ;KV erifyAI1 ) = 1}
The above protocol allows users to show that Ca is a com-
mitment to the private pseudonym ma, and a successful ex-
ecution of it proves that the user owns the certificate, while
not revealing any PII except mj . Based on this information,
AI2 can issue a new certificate that contains the pseudonym
ma and add a new assertion that the user is above 18 years
old - PIImu. A new secondary certificate - called SecCert2
can thus be issued by executing: SecCert2=HiddenSign(
Ca, mu;KSignAI2). The user can verify the correctness of
the secondary certificate by executing the following: Veri-
fyHiddenSign( SecCert2, ma, mu;KV erifyAI2) = 1. This
protocol is useful in allowing users to obtain multiple cer-
tificates while still respecting requirement 2.1 for data min-
imization, and 3.2 for anonymous authentication.
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Protocol 3 - proving relations between PII: This cre-
dential mechanism can also prove the relation between data
items (PII) from various certificates without revealing the
value of the data items. This is useful because a user might
have to show multiple certificates to reveal a set of PII to
a provider. However, the user also needs to prove that all
of the certificates belong to the same user with the same
pseudonym without revealing the pseudonym itself. As-
sume that a user in an interaction needs to reveal the user’s
state of residence from PII me from Cert1 and the user
is above 18 years old from PII mu from SecCert2, while
proving that both certificates contains the same pseudonym
and still keeping the other PII secret. The protocol repre-
sented by the following notation can be executed:
PK{ (Cert1, ma..md, mf ..mj , SecCert2) :
VerifySign(Cert1,ma..md,mf ..mj ,me;KV erifyAI1)=1 ∧
VerifySign(SecCert2, ma, mu;KV erifyAI2 ) = 1}
The above protocol allows the recipient of the certificates
to be sure that the user owns both certificates and, by us-
ing the technique of demonstrating relation between data
items (in this case equality of item ma in both certifi-
cates), knows that these two certificates contain the same
pseudonym without learning its value. Along with a good
negotiation protocol, this mechanism is useful for fulfilling
data minimization (2.1) and registration (3.1) requirements.
Protocol 4 - conditional anonymity revocation: As
per requirement 3.4, sometimes anonymity revocation is
needed. To this end, the protocol represented by the fol-
lowing notation can be used:
PK{ (Cert1, ma...mi) :
VerifySign(Cert1, ma...mi, mj ; KV erifyAI1) = 1 ∧
E = Enc(ma, Conditions;KLegalAuthorityEnc)}
The above protocol proves that the user is the legitimate
owner of the certificate, while disclosing only PII mj . In
addition, the pseudonym is encrypted using verifiable en-
cryption technique which assures that the encrypted text is
the data item ma from certificate Cert1. A set of condi-
tions are also included to specify the conditions upon which
the data item ma can be revealed. By using this mecha-
nism, the user can remain anonymous unless the conditions
are fulfilled. Nevertheless, the conditions in this scheme are
not cryptographically enforceable other than through trust
that the authority will only revoke the anonymity when the
’conditions’ are met [3]. Further research is needed to allow
enforcement of the conditions prior to revocation.
Finally, to fulfill requirement 2.2, Negotiator component
still needs to be developed. Further research is still needed
to determine the best way to design this component to sup-
port the required features. Similarly, to fulfill requirement
3.3, the best data storage method to handle the storage of
user’s PII in the AI needs a further research, especially in
ensuring the enforcement of user’s involvement, such as an
explicit consent, before any PII stored can be used.
5. Use case scenario
Two use case scenarios will be provided: the setup and
SSO scenarios (based on SAML 2.0 SSO).
5.1. Setup
The setup process involves the user obtaining several pri-
mary certificates from one or more AIs. As these are pri-
mary certificates, off-line documents, such as birth certifi-
cate, can be used as the basis for issuing the certificates.
Primary certificates contain the user’s pseudonym, which is
unique within the AI that issued the certificate realm, and
each AI’s identifier is unique within a particular federation
only. The combination of the user’s pseudonym and the
AI’s identifier that issued the primary certificates provide
the unique identifier of a user within that federation.
From the possession of primary certificates, the user can
obtain a set of secondary certificates by using the blind
certification mechanism (Protocol 2). Primary certificates
would normally be in the form of AC, while secondary cer-
tificates could be in the form of AC or CC. Assume that the
user has Cert1 as defined in section 4.2. If ma is the user’s
pseudonym, mj is the PII to be based on to produce mu as
the data item to be included in the secondary certificate is-
sued by AI2, then the protocol represented by this notation
can be executed:
PK{ (Cert1, r, ma...mi) : Ca = Commit(ma,r) ∧
VerifySign( Cert1, ma...mi, mj ;KV erifyAI1 ) = 1}
SecCert2=HiddenSign( Ca, mu;KSignAI2)
User verifies the correctness of the secondary certificate:
VerifyHiddenSign( SecCert2, ma, mu;KV erifyAI2) = 1
The above notation shows that AI2 has to verify thatma was
issued by AI1, and create a new SecCert2 by using hidden
signing technique to sign the obfuscated ma and the new
data item mu. User can verify the correctness of SecCert2
by using the AI2’s public signature verification key.
5.2. Single sign-on
The SSO process (Figure 3) does not change much from
the normal SSO protocol. The messages in bold lines are
the normal SAML SSO messages, while those in broken
lines are the UFed messages extending the normal protocol.
The scenario is based on the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO
Profile. The user is anonymous to IdP and SP throughout
the whole process. The user has Cert1 and SecCert2 from
the previous setup operation.
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Figure 3. The UFed SSO
1. User requests a service from SP
2. SP determines the user’s IdP. There are several meth-
ods to do this, but it could be as simple as asking the
user to choose from a list of IdPs in the federation that
the SP belongs to.
3. SP requests for the user to be authenticated by the cho-
sen IdP by sending the <AuthnRequest> message.
4. (a) Upon receiving the <AuthnRequest> message,
the UFed Adapter intercepts the normal protocol
flows. The user’s and IdP’s negotiator compo-
nent would start a per-session registration nego-
tiation process to agree on the PII, the disclosure
level, and if accountability is important, negotia-
tion for the conditions on which anonymity revo-
cation can be exercised.
(b) When a set of PII is agreed, the user sends the
required certificate(s) to IdP. Normally these are
non-sensitive information that are sufficient for
general needs. One or more of credential proto-
cols (section 4.2) can be executed:
i. If the agreed set of PII require only one
certificate (for example PII me to mh from
Cert1), then Protocol 1 (partial release of
PII) represented by the following notation
can be executed:
PK{ (Cert1, ma...md, mi...mj):
VerifySign( Cert1, ma...md,mi...mj ,
me...mh;KV erifyAI1 ) = 1}
This protocol requires the IdP to verify that
Cert1 was issued by AI1 without learning
any PII (including the pseudonym ma) ex-
cept those that were agree to be revealed.
ii. If several certificates are needed (requiring
data item PII me to mh from Cert1 and mu
from SecCert2), then Protocol 3 (proving
relations between data items) can be exe-
cuted to verify that all certificates belong to
the same user:
PK{ (Cert1, ma..md,mi..mj , SecCert2):
VerifySign(Cert1,ma..md,mi..mj ,me..mh;
KV erifyAI1 ) = 1} ∧
VerifySign(SecCert2, ma, mu;
KV erifyAI2)=1}
The above notation shows that the IdP ver-
ifies that Cert1 was issued by AI1 and
SecCert2 was issued by AI2, and that both
certificates belong to the same pseudonym
ma without learning any value except those
that were agreed to be revealed.
iii. If there should be a provision for anonymity
revocation, then the combination of either
Protocol 1 and 4 (conditional anonymity re-
vocation) can be executed:
PK{ (Cert1, ma..md, mi..mj):
VerifySign(Cert1,ma..md,mi..mj ,me..mh;
KV erifyAI1 ) = 1} ∧
E = Enc(ma,Conditions;
KLegalAuthorityEnc) }
or Protocol 3 and 4:
PK{(Cert1, ma..md,mi..mj ,SecCert2):
VerifySign( Cert1,ma...md,mi...mj ,
me...mh;KV erifyAI1 ) = 1} ∧
VerifySign(SecCert2, ma, mu;
KV erifyAI2 ) = 1} ∧
E = Enc(ma, Conditions;
KLegalAuthorityEnc) }
The above notations show that in addition
to what IdP verifies as per 4b(i) and 4b(ii),
IdP also has the encrypted text of the user’s
pseudonym. If the Conditions were fulfilled,
the Legal Authority can decrypt text and re-
voke the user’s anonymity.
Upon successful user’s certificates verification,
the IdP should assign a one-time pseudonym for
the user.
5. Normal SSO protocol is resumed. The IdP returns the
authentication response message containing the one-
time pseudonym and the user’s PII released from the
previous step to the SP.
6. SP decides to grant or refuse services to user.
The above SSO scenario shows that there is a logical sep-
aration of the role of AI and IdP. The user’s identifier is only
known to the AI who originally issued it, but during trans-
action, the identifier is not known to the IdP. Even if AI
and IdP are the same physical entity, the use of anonymous
authentication means that during the SSO process, the IdP
only knows that the user was known by itself (since IdP and
AI in this case were the same entity), but not the exact user.
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However, it is equally important that the revealed PII in the
per-session registration does not leak any linkable informa-
tion to IdP. Paranoid use of CC instead of AC would help.
6. Discussion of UFed
Several issues related to UFed’s operations will be dis-
cussed: problems related with using one-time pseudonym
(OTP), how the design of UFed could prevent SPs and IdPs
from illegally correlating user’s information, user’s negoti-
ation power, and preventing abuse of the certified PII mech-
anism by providers.
6.1. OTP and accountability
One-time pseudonym could pose a problem in the ac-
countability area. Requirement 3.4 states that user’s activ-
ities should be logged. However, since user is only known
by the one-time pseudonym, the linking of the log infor-
mation (which is only linked with one-time pseudonym) to
the user’s actual pseudonym could be problematic. The so-
lution is straight forward. If accountability is not impor-
tant, requirement 3.4 states that it should not be logged.
Otherwise, the execution of Protocol 4 at step 4b during
SSO stage would provide a verifiable encrypted text of the
user’s actual pseudonym. This text is stored by the IdP,
and this encrypted text should be linked with the one-time
pseudonym of the user at that session and the session ID.
When anonymity revocation is needed, the SP could pro-
vide the IdP with the one-time pseudonym (that was linked
with the user’s log information) and the session ID. The IdP
would be able to link this information with the encrypted
pseudonym text. If the agreed conditions upon which the
user’s anonymity can be revoked are fulfilled, the IdP could
provide the encrypted text to legal authority who has the
decryption key to revoke the user’s anonymity.
However, there is a lack of enforcement of anonymity re-
vocation conditions [3]. The enforcement is crucial in pre-
venting abuse of this capability. Further research is required
in this area.
6.2. OTP and account linkage
FSSO features the ability to link existing user’s account
between providers: given that a user already has accounts
with both IdP and SP, FSSO allows the linking of these
two accounts so that users can be identified according to the
original identifiers they use at each site. Account linkage is
privacy-intrusive. IdP and SP have to know the actual value
of the user’s pseudonym. Account linkage violates require-
ment 3.2, and it has a severe implication to user’s privacy
when the only guarantee user has that IdP and SP will not
collaborate and link the information is a mere ’trust’ [11].
In UFed account linkage is not possible due to the use of
one-time pseudonym and anonymous authentication. It is
a deliberate decision to make account linkage feature un-
achievable in UFed.
6.3. OTP and profiling without consent
In FSSO, it is easy for providers to link a user’s informa-
tion without the user’s consent. The account linkage feature
makes this technically trivial and a threat to user’s privacy
[11]. However, UFed is useful in preventing this. UFed
does not support account linkage. Both IdP and SP do not
know the actual user’s pseudonym due to anonymous au-
thentication feature. Thus, the ability of providers to link
user’s information by IdP and SP has been curtailed. How-
ever, the revealed PII during step 4b of SSO operation could
unintentionally reveal linkable information. For example, it
is common for providers to link user’s information based on
the user’s address, name and date of birth. While the user’s
pseudonym is not revealed, these other PII combined could
be just as identifying. Therefore, the key to prevent this
from happening would be the paranoid use of CC, instead
of AC. Users also have to be very selective in disclosure of
any PII, regardless of the disclosure level. Again, the be-
havior of the negotiator component plays a key role in this
respect.
Even if the revealed PII do not leak any strong user-
identifiable information, the AI has the user’s pseudonym
and the PII values. However, since each AI would issue a
different pseudonyms to a user, the ability to link the infor-
mation based on pseudonym has been decreased. But simi-
lar to previous case, user’s name, address and date of birth,
if they are known to the AIs, could still uniquely identify a
user. However, the separation of role between AI and IdP
(as explained in section 5.2) is such that the AIs would only
know the user’s PII, but not able to track their activities,
and thus limiting the ability to profile user’s behavior, such
as shopping preferences. However, for best privacy, techni-
cal solutions to prevent AIs linking information are needed.
Several potential solutions could be:
1. Enabling the UA to intelligently divide the disclosure
of user’s PII at each AI in such a way that combination
of PII values at any AI do not result in a strong user-
identifiable information.
2. Use a secure data storage whereby the stored user’s PII
can only be used with explicit user consent (require-
ment 3.3).
Both approaches require further research to produce a con-
crete method of their applications into UFed system.
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6.4. OTP and further attribute request
The UFed SSO scenario as detailed in section 5.2 is
based on one-time pseudonym. SP can only provide ser-
vices to users based on the known attributes that IdP pro-
vided in step 5. If additional user’s attributes are required,
the SP has to obtain them from the user. However, since the
user is only known by the one-time pseudonym, a protocol
needs to be designed to enable the user to prove that the pro-
vided attribute values belong to the user without revealing
the true pseudonym. It is theoretically possible by combin-
ing the use of Protocol 2, 3 and 4. A protocol to handle this
situation needs to be produced.
6.5. Negotiation and certified PII abuse
The reality is that users are generally powerless in de-
ciding whether a PII is to be revealed or remained pri-
vate. Frequently, it is either the user provides the required
PII or accepts refusal of service. While it seems that to-
day’s on-line commerce environment renders users’ negoti-
ation power to a minimal, the negotiator component and the
design of UFed provide the technical solutions to reduce
this power imbalance. This shift is also reflected by the
European government-funded identity management system
PRIME whereby the user’s ability to negotiate is built in its
design.
Without the negotiator component, the use of the cre-
dential mechanism as introduced in section 4.2 could po-
tentially put users at a disadvantaged position. Providers
(IdPs and SPs) could take full advantage of this system by
requiring users to provide only certified PII. However, the
use of negotiator component is expected to put an enforce-
able limit to this abuse. The key is on the behavior of the
negotiator component in the face of providers wanting cer-
tified PII that the users do not feel comfortable disclosing.
An ideal behavior is to allow the user to provide either cer-
tified Level 1 disclosure of the required PII or to provide the
uncertified PII value, both are supported by UFed.
7. Conclusion and future works
In this paper, UFed is described as a potential solution
for providing a better identity management system to al-
low user-controlled privacy. Future works will mainly be
a further research in the area of anonymous credential sys-
tem to enable concrete enforcement of conditions prior to
anonymity revocation and the materialization of some of the
concepts mentioned: the development of User Agent, the
UFed Adapter, the development of the negotiator compo-
nent, the negotiation protocol, the realization of UFed pro-
tocol extensions to support different FSSO scenarios (SSO,
attribute request, single sign-off, and others), and the appro-
priate data storage scheme.
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